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Abstract—Changes to the EU-US agreements on transatlantic 
data transmission are accepted. With the updates leading to an 
adequacy decision for the Privacy Shield, the European 
Commission further advances US adherence to the General Data 
Protection Regulation. The regulation comes with increasing 
territorial scope for the processing of personal data of persons in 
the EU, and includes the risk of substantial fines. Soon, a Privacy 
Shield self-certification will be necessary for US organizations 
which process EU data. Compliance with these requirements may 
be assisted by privacy by design. In particular, a recent approach 
to this uses privacy design strategies. Our paper takes this 
approach and applies it to the Privacy Shield and its suggested 
changes. It then explores a case study within scope of the Privacy 
Shield to demonstrate how to apply privacy by design using 
strategies.   
Keywords—GDPR; data protection legislation; privacy by 
design; privacy design strategies; privacy shield  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The introduction of new data protection laws, in particular 
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [1] and the EU-
US Privacy Shield [2], overrides earlier legislation with more 
comprehensive protection. These legal documents are important 
components of the EU’s approach to protecting informational 
privacy, even for companies outside the EU. The GDPR 
facilitates the free movement of data, while respecting 
fundamental rights, and the Privacy Shield allows companies in 
the US to claim an adequate level of privacy protection. The 
organizations which are adhering to older legislation are not the 
only ones which need to update their practices, policies and 
implementations. Since the new laws apply on a much greater 
scope, many entities are looking towards their compliance.  
Legislation in general does not often specify direct software 
design requirements. Rather, certain elements are prescribed. 
One such element is data protection or privacy by design (PbD) 
[3]. Specifically, GDPR Art. 25 mentions data protection (DP) 
‘by design and by default’ as a requirement, given costs and the 
state of the art. PbD (or DPbD) is an approach to software 
development which protects privacy (ensures DP) from the 
early/concept stages of the software development life cycle [4]. 
Some tools exist for PbD, including privacy design strategies.  
‘Strategies’ use the GDPR to formulate software design 
goals, and then suggest ‘privacy patterns’ (recurring solutions to 
common design problems in privacy) for implementation [5]. 
These were initially designed to assist in adhering to the EU 
Data Protection Directive [4]. The updated strategies provide a 
direct path from concept analysis (where PbD starts) to design 
and implementation through the privacy patterns. This paper 
explores a case study concerning the Privacy Shield in 
particular, by implementing these privacy design strategies.  
The research methodology for this paper includes a literature 
review primarily of the legislation, and supporting tools of the 
PbD approach – the strategies and patterns in particular. We 
build our work upon previous advances in the field, namely on 
that of the strategies, and of PbD therein.  
In this paper, we aim to demonstrate how to achieve what we 
call near-compliance. Specifically, software designed with 
compliance in mind from the beginning, resulting in less legal 
consultant work. An engineering effort primarily, which aims at 
full compliance, prior to legal review. In this case, to the Privacy 
Shield, with the help of our strategies.  
The hypothetical example for our case study, Company X, 
should apply to the Privacy Shield without falling under direct 
GDPR scope – as this overrides the need for the agreement. 
Company X is a large US organization which features in many 
markets, one of which is deep learning. It pursues this out of 
public interest in their software based labs. Its subsidiary in the 
EU uses medical data from EU-based health services for deep 
learning and preventative research purposes. We explore the 
hypothetical transfer of this personal data to the US for further 
compatible processing, where Company X has better facilities. 
This paper first introduces relevant background regarding 
the GDPR and Privacy Shield, as well as some recurring terms. 
It then discusses the strategies and their related concepts 
including ‘tactics’ and the patterns. We introduce and elaborate 
on our case study, and then provide our conclusions.  
II. THE EU-US PRIVACY SHIELD AND GDPR 
In this section, we discuss the new EU DP regulation, its 
differences with the Directive, the EU-US Privacy Shield 
agreement, and the amendments to the agreement.  
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A. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
The GDPR will be in force from May 25th 2018 [1]. It 
replaces the EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, and will 
apply to all member states without having a distinct national 
implementation. Article 4 (1) and (2) of the GDPR [1] provide 
definitions for ‘personal data’ and ‘processing’ respectively. 
Personal data in the GDPR refers to any information which 
relates to an identifiable natural person. Processing thereof is 
any usage of that personal data, from collection to erasure and 
anything in between. The GDPR and original Directive provide 
very specific examples, such as (non-exhaustively) making 
available, adaptation, alteration, or alignment (Art. 4(2)).  
The new measures of the upcoming Regulation include more 
than its predecessor. For example, the GDPR introduces fines of 
ten million euros, or 2% of previous annual worldwide turnover 
(Art. 83(4)) – double in some cases (Art. 83(5)). It also requires 
data controllers to designate a Data Protection Officer in some 
circumstances (Art. 37). Notice and consent are well known 
principles for which the GDPR enforces strict requirements. 
Contact and data retention information clauses (e.g. within Art. 
13, 14) feature, as well as data breach notification (Art. 34). 
Furthermore, explicit, freely given, and informed consent must 
be provable by data controllers (Art. 7). It is also withdrawable. 
The right to be forgotten is refined into the right to erasure and 
to data portability (Art. 17 and Art. 20).  
The GDPR includes greater territorial scope, notably and 
importantly, international application to those who process 
personal data of individuals in the EU (Art. 3). Exceptions to this 
include legitimate national security or law enforcement purposes 
concerning detection, investigation, prevention, or prosecution. 
The GDPR has more rules for transferring personal data to 
international organizations or third countries than internally to 
the Union (Art. 44). One of these rules is based on an adequacy 
decision, that is a sufficient level of protection as per Art. 45(2) 
– assessing the entity’s laws, supervision authorities, and 
international commitments.  
If a country lacks adequate privacy law, a legal agreement 
may give grounds for adequacy, e.g. Safe Harbor – the original 
attempt at facilitating trans-Atlantic data flows between the EU 
and US. The Schrems case [6], where Facebook was taken to 
court in Ireland over privacy violations, revealed a flaw in the 
use of the Safe Harbor agreement – notably surveillance. This 
resulted in a renegotiation leading to a new adequacy decision, 
fulfilling Art. 45 of the GDPR – the EU-US Privacy Shield [8].  
B. The EU-US Privacy Shield 
The Privacy Shield is an effort to enable protected data 
transfers out of the EU and through the US for commercial 
purposes. It does not merely replace Safe Harbor, however, it 
provides a base on which to introduce oversight and redress, as 
well as stricter justification requirements for repurposing. 
The main objective of the Privacy Shield is to provide 
‘essential equivalence’ to the GDPR [7]. However, as noted 
below, the agreement initially fell short of this. This had led to 
an expectation of future versions, and as of July 12th 2016 a 
revision has been accepted [8][9][2]. Prior to this the European 
Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) provided an opinion which 
suggested changes to the Privacy Shield [7]. It built upon the 
opinion of the Article 29 Working Party (WP29) [10], which 
when combined with the EDPS opinion make an authoritative 
overview. We include these opinions in our analysis. The next 
section highlights their suggestions and the resulting changes to 
the Privacy Shield. 
C. Privacy Shield Amendments 
Both authorities welcome the improvements made by the 
Privacy Shield, though each noted significant and necessary 
room for improvement. For one, the aspects covered by the 
Privacy Shield are (still) spread out beyond a single document, 
including the adequacy decision and its annexes [2][7][9]. 
The overall flaws mentioned by the EDPS and WP29 feature 
the omissions and insufficient specifications of data 
minimization / retention and automated / bulk processing, poor 
clarification of purpose specification / limitation, exceptions / 
derogations, as well as room for improvement for onward 
transfer, redress, oversight, and rights to access/object  [7]. Of 
these, clarifications are provided in the new revision for some 
items, with improvement on several previously lacking items 
[2]. However, the risk based approach to re-identification has 
been seen to contradict WP29’s opinion on identifiability [9]. 
These flaws (italicized) are mostly in the Privacy Principles 
section, Annex II – the main body of the agreement, where in 
some cases the lack of precise language, or specific purposes and 
requirements have been seen as failing to limit interference with 
rights to data protection and privacy [7]. Both the WP29 and 
EDPS aim for clear purposes and precise requirements for 
exceptions to the Privacy Shield’s protection. While somewhat 
alleviated in the adopted text [9], some imprecision still exists. 
For example, the adopted text still includes ‘has been’ vs. ‘to 
be’ transferred, where the EDPS notes a lack of accuracy may 
result in misunderstandings. For instance, in “...limitations on 
the access and use of personal data transferred…” in recital 55 
of the draft decision [7]. Onward transfers now need contractual 
binding to take place [9]. Another example is variance on 
purpose ‘consistency’ or ‘[material] difference’ in purposes [7]. 
These might have allowed false interpretations. We expected the 
use of ‘[in]compatible’ purposes to appear in coming revisions 
regularly. Instead clarification was given. This includes both 
examples of compatible processing activities, and the notion that 
material difference is possible while ‘compatible’, but requires 
new consent [2][9].  
In particular, the reuse of human resource or medical data for 
marketing purposes was troubling – we thus believed that 
Privacy Shield Annex II.II 9(b)(i) and II.II 14(b)(i) would be 
removed. Instead 9(b)(i) (human resource data reuse) gained 
compatible purpose consideration [9]. Medical data reuse still 
merely requires notice, which is fortunate for Company X in our 
case study. We had also expected more automation safeguards 
against harmful performance, credit, reliability, or conduct 
related personal data usage. While the US offers credit, 
mortgage, and employment protections, the area is to be 
monitored by the Commission [2]. Furthermore, despite 
‘relevance’ not being considered sufficient in the context of data 
minimization by the EDPS [7], the usage is retained. The EDPS 
suggests that this term be adapted to “adequate and not 
excessive” or “limited to the information that is necessary.”  
Less clear cut are the exceptions granted to certain types of 
processing in the interest of free speech or expression, such as 
journalism, which contest the equal importance of privacy. 
These contradict key GDPR requirements, and still need to be 
balanced. On-going suggestions for this include more precise 
language to outline the scope of these exceptions and ensure that 
they only are used for proportionate free speech purposes. Some 
exceptions regarding initially commercial purpose data, 
including US laws still allowing public interest access while 
affecting personal data may eventually be reassessed. The EDPS 
has recommended international commitments for access to these 
by authorities [7]. 
Additional means to pursue redress by individuals in the EU 
would follow suggestions to reduce the current complexity. 
Presently redress is possible as per recital 43 of the adequacy 
decision [8]. The EDPS had suggested additional prevention 
through compliance monitoring by US authorities, as well as 
certification supervision by Data Protection Authorities (DPA), 
noting that the Judicial Redress Act does not have sufficient 
scope [7]. Further meaningful review may feature spot 
verifications on both commercial and authority access. 
Having discussed the flaws still present in the Privacy 
Shield, which may result in future changes, it is important that a 
company which self-certifies does so expecting to eventually 
provide near GDPR level protection. The further monitoring of 
the situation by the Commission may result in additional 
changes. However, we find that medical data use for research 
receives special exemptions under the Privacy Shield, especially 
in the context of automated processing. Considering need for 
data protection by design and by default (Art. 25), we use the 
PbD tool, privacy design strategies, in our case study.  
III. STRATEGIES & TACTICS 
A privacy design strategy “specifies a distinct architectural 
goal in privacy by design to achieve a certain level of privacy 
protection” [5]. Privacy design strategies are a technique for 
achieving privacy by design first noted by Hoepman [4]. They 
previously translated the original data protection principles into 
design goals more accessible to software engineers. These 
strategies have been extended to make them more relevant in the 
GDPR context, and provide a direct path from concept to design 
implementation [5]. This is achieved through privacy patterns, 
common solutions to recurring design problems in privacy by 
design. Also introduced were privacy design tactics, a spin on 
software architecture’s system quality attribute ‘tactics’ which 
connect the strategies to the patterns. 
Both the strategies and tactics use capitalized verbs which 
more or less summarize their intent. They are shown in TABLE 
I. SEPARATE for instance can be approached through both 
processing in isolation, and in distributing the data, both 
logically and physically [5]. The ongoing collection of privacy 
patterns which the strategies and tactics connect to are found in 
[11]. Our case study uses a number of these concepts to 
demonstrate an example in which the Privacy Shield applies. 
TABLE I. STRATEGIES BY TACTICS (ADAPTED FROM [5])





























IV. CASE STUDY 
Our example, Company X, is a receiving data controller, and 
its EU-based subsidiary is the initial data controller. In 
particular, we focus on its preventative deep learning re-use of 
medical data initially held by the subsidiary. 
In most cases Company X must follow the GDPR directly. 
The GDPR’s scope generally includes it based on Art. 3(1) [1] 
(i.e. intent to provide products or services to individuals in the 
EU). However, in some contexts the GDPR is not directly 
applicable. Our case study explores one such context. 
The GDPR’s scope is subject to the context of processing by 
an establishment. Where Company X processes the personal 
data of a person in the EU, it falls under scope since it has 
premises in the EU (the subsidiary research institute) with 
processing context, or intends to provide products and services 
to persons in the EU (also the subsidiary). This applicability 
fades where processing is not in those contexts, where the 
controller becomes self-certified with the Privacy Shield as 
grounds for processing. In those cases, the Privacy Shield 
applies to personal data transfers out of the EU to the US, and 
any further third party flow. This case study explores Company 
X self-certifying under the Privacy Shield in order to do this. 
A. Repurpose of Medical Data 
In our example, Company X’s subsidiary research institute 
receives EU medical data under research purposes, following no 
request for new consent from data subjects by the medical 
institution. This can happen in the case of research.  
Research purposes are awarded special exemptions in the 
GDPR, as stated by Art. 89 (i.e. derogations on certain rights for 
research), and further described in e.g. recital 157 (justifying 
coupling registries for enhancing knowledge).  Predicting 
disease can be seen as a legitimate interest, though a transfer 
might also be done on the basis of national legislation until the 
GDPR comes into force. For example in the UK Data Protection 
Act, §4(3) Schedule 3(8) or Schedule 4(4) may allow further 
transfers and processing of medical data so long as only medical 
(including research) professionals are using it [12]. Of course 
even when countries are outside the EU, they are affected by the 
GDPR – the UK may require an adequacy decision like the 
Privacy Shield. 
For Company X, recital 33 suggests that consent may play 
some role even in these research purposes (specifically 
distinction between consent for different research areas). 
Though, as per Art. 89(1) and recital 52, 62, 65, a data subject 
might not retain their rights to access, erase, rectify, restrict, or 
object to processed data. At best, Art. 14(5)(b) and recital 113 
include notification if it is not considered too much effort. The 
nature of the data, Art. 9(2)(j) affirms (processing necessary for 
research), is exempt from the prohibition of special category 
data processing in Art. 9(1). This data may be kept identifiable 
longer as necessary for that purpose – Art. 5(1)(e).  
Company X desires to use their local US infrastructure to 
further their EU research efforts. They wish to continue using 
the personal data acquired by their EU subsidiary. They choose 
to receive the data as a controller instead of a processor, as 
processors are subject to more responsibilities (especially 
regarding obligation to the controller, and standard contractual 
clauses) – Art. 28. As a controller, it determines purposes or 
means, within the boundaries of the purpose it gives to its 
subsidiary: e.g. disease prevention and detection through deep 
learning and artificial intelligence.   
In this context, Company X is a controller not bound by the 
GDPR directly, but by the Privacy Shield. If it infringes upon 
any obligations within, it will be accountable under US law. This 
may lead to intervention from the ombudsperson or a fine. 
B. Software Considerations 
The strategies are designed to facilitate a certain level of 
privacy protection, allowing engineers to attempt compliance. 
Each strategy and its contained tactics and patterns are applied 
where necessary. The patterns and their sources may be found 
in [11]. In this case study we recommend the following. 
1) MINIMIZE 
Company X is under obligation to minimize the data as much as 
possible while still fulfilling the research purpose (recital 156). 
Though more data may translate to better results, and allows 
them to warn patients and their doctors – doing so is 
incompatible with their purposes. Therefore, it will be expected 
to reduce identifiability as much as it can without jeopardizing 
the learning (Privacy Shield II.II (14)(a)(i)) [2].  Training the 
learning system with data types which cannot correlate to 
symptoms, like names and identity numbers, may even provide 
poorer predictions. It may wish to choose the types of data that 
are more relevant, and remove those which are not. The SELECT 
and STRIP tactics should be used, including for example Partial 
Identification [13], Select Before You Collect [4], and Strip 
Metadata [14]. 
SELECT: decide on a case by case basis on the full or partial 
usage of personal data, akin to whitelisting or opt-in. 
STRIP: removing unnecessary personal data fields from the 
system’s representation of each user. [5] 
2) HIDE 
Company X is under strong obligations to protect their 
highly sensitive data from unauthorized access, use, sharing etc. 
as their research purpose does not exempt them from this – e.g. 
recital 53 (meriting higher protection). In particular, the 
transferring of data from their subsidiary should benefit from 
state of the art security safeguards. Furthermore, applied as a 
tactic instead of strategy, there are some cases where data (such 
as confidential data (Privacy Shield II.III (8)(c)), or pseudonym 
details (GDPR Art. 4 (5))) should be separated from other data.  
The above considerations could benefit from all HIDE tactics. 
Company X could utilize [Purpose-based] Access Control [14], 
Pseudonymous Identity [15], K-anonymity [4], Local/Network 
Encryption, and finally Link Padding [15], with one pattern per 
HIDE tactic respectively below and in TABLE I.  
RESTRICT: preventing unauthorized access to personal data. 
SEPARATE: preventing the correlation of personal information 
to reduce the likelihood of privacy violations. 
MIX: processing personal data randomly within a large 
enough group to reduce correlation.  
OBFUSCATE: preventing understandability of personal data to 
those without the ability to decipher it. 
DISSOCIATE: removing the correlation between different 
pieces of personal data. [5] 
3) SEPARATE 
Many cases benefit from ISOLATE and DISTRIBUTE, though 
these approaches to privacy protection do not directly facilitate 
the principles featured in the Privacy Shield. Not centralizing 
data, however, will make correlating data into meaningful 
predictions tougher. Company X does not need to utilize this 
strategy or its tactics, but doing so may afford its data subjects 
better privacy protection. It should try to find a good balance 
between personal data separation and effective deep learning. 
4) ABSTRACT 
Like with SEPARATE, Company X’s use of deep learning to 
draw connections between data may be hindered by this 
strategy. In some cases, it may be able to generalize data without 
this drawback. However, their unique case does not really justify 
this. They are not obliged to use this strategy or its tactics, 
though in some cases the simplification of details can result in 
better predictive systems – by abstracting away less meaningful 
information.   
5) INFORM 
As mentioned in Section A and Section II.C, at best there is 
a proportionate need to NOTIFY data subjects that their data is 
being used for research. Data Breach Notification [4] is 
especially necessary, though not specifically to data subjects. 
When self-certifying, a public Privacy Policy will EXPLAIN 
usage. Also as per Privacy Shield II.II (8)(i), data subjects have 
the right to request access to verify that usage, and have it 
corrected where it is inaccurate or processed in violation [2]. 
SUPPLY: making available extensive resources on the 
processing of personal data, including policies, processes, and 
potential risks. 
NOTIFY: alerting data subjects to any new information about 
processing of their personal data in a timely manner. 
EXPLAIN: detailing information on personal data processing in 
a concise and understandable form. [5] 
6) CONTROL 
Also mentioned in Section A, the use of medical data which 
already acquired consent allows Company X to overlook data 
subject rights to reasonable levels of control. In fact, doing 
otherwise would likely constitute an incompatible purpose. 
7) ENFORCE 
Company X is not entirely without responsibility here, it still 
needs to CREATE, MAINTAIN, and UPHOLD their policies. These 
include their legal responsibilities, their procedures and their 
practices. For the first two tactics, this will relate to the privacy 
policy in particular. For UPHOLD, there are Sticky Policies, and 
Usage Control Infrastructure [14] patterns. In addition, 
Company X is obliged to allow for recourse with clear and 
usable mechanisms, response within 45 days of a complaint is 
also necessary (Privacy Shield II.II (11)(d)) [2].  
CREATE: acknowledging the value of privacy and deciding 
upon policies which enable it, and processes which respect 
personal data. 
MAINTAIN: considering privacy when designing or modifying 
features, and updating policies and processes to better protect 
personal data.  
UPHOLD: ensuring that policies are adhered to by treating 
personal data as an asset, and privacy as a goal to incentivize 
as a critical feature. [5] 
8) DEMONSTRATE 
Finally, it must show adherence to its responsibilities to the 
Department of Commerce by verifying its attestations, through 
self or external compliance REPORT. This must be signed 
annually by an authorized representative. All records pertaining 
to this must be kept. For Non-repudiation [16], it should LOG 
relevant usage, and perform a regular AUDIT. 
LOG: tracking all processing of data, without revealing 
personal data, securing and reviewing the information 
gathered for any risks.  
AUDIT: examining all day to day activities for any risks to 
personal data, and responding to any discrepancies seriously. 
REPORT: analyzing collected information on tests, audits, and 
logs periodically to review improvements to the protection of 
personal data. [5] 
Company X is not subject to repurpose justification as it is 
not repurposing. Its use of the research exception is only valid if 
it stays within that purpose. Doing so is not very difficult, 
though, as new research purposes will not be incompatible. This 
is like the earlier free speech argument for journalism, where 
public interest is balanced against privacy. As this data was 
owned by a medical institute, it was also commercial data. This 
is an aspect which we hope revisions will better specify to ensure 
proportionality. 
The minimization and retention aspects are justified by the 
purpose as well, much of which is bulk and automated. This as 
we mentioned earlier will receive a few more safeguards, but 
due to purpose limitation, it will encounter difficulty if it 
influences data subjects' lives. An item perhaps worth further 
exploring is the use of ‘key-coded data’ (Privacy Shield II.II 
(14)(g)) where a transfer of this from the EU ‘would not [be] 
subject to the Privacy Shield Principles’ [2].  
Company X is subject to oversight, but not so easily to data 
subject rights to access/object – as their consent was obtained 
prior to the transfer. This may be improved by way of spot 
checks, and better supervision by DPAs. In this situation 
particularly, as it features very sensitive information, Company 
X would be watched closely. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
We explored the Privacy Shield and the criticisms by the 
Article 29 Working Party and Data Protection Supervisor. We 
provided a context in which the agreement applies after the 
GDPR comes into effect, to a recent and relevant hypothetical 
case in the medical research sector. The situation we describe in 
this paper was used to demonstrate how privacy and or data 
protection by design can be considered using privacy design 
strategies and the tactics and privacy patterns therein.  
We determined that the considerations Company X would 
need to act upon or those it would benefit from, in medical data 
transfer from its subsidiary to the US, are considerably lower 
than most situations. Their research purpose permits a number 
of liberties, while restricting them from providing much 
information and control to data subjects. This results in a focus 
on HIDE, ENFORCE, and DEMONSTRATE – a bare minimum. The 
unique focus of deep learning also justifies less minimization 
than usual. Aside from using directly identifiable data (full 
names, identity numbers, etc.) their only need for MINIMIZE is to 
prevent wasting time and resources on useless data – their 
research purpose does not permit commercial opportunities. 
Some suggestions for future work include different cases, 
those with more comprehensive applicability. The strategies 
themselves could also receive validation or evaluation in a 
practical commercial setting, with feedback from developers 
and legal teams regarding near-compliance.  
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